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1. Introduction    
Consideration for security level in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) should depend on the 
demand of the intended applications. As energy consumption increase linearly with security 
level, the security designer should carefully choose the best security technique and the most 
suitable security parameters enough to protect the intended application. With the 
advancement and demand of WSNs applications in areas such as  the  military, structural 
health monitoring, transportation, agriculture, smart home and many more, the system 
stands to be exposed to too many potential threats. It is generally considered  that 
applications such as smart home, transportation and agriculture need no security or be less 
secure compared to military and medical applications. However, sensor networks make 
large-scale attacks become trivial when private information on the entire system can 
instantly reach the hand of attackers. Due to the nature of WSNs that are left unattended 
and limited resources, there exist an urgent need  for higher security features in sensor 
nodes and its overall systems. Without it, attackers with their own intentions and targets 
combined with their capabilities and sophisticated tools will always become a threat to 
future WSNs applications. However, latest technology in embedded security combined (low 
power, on-SOC memory, small size) with trusted computing specifications (ensuring trusted 
communication and user) is believed to enhance security features for future WSNs 
applications.  
 
To this instant, research in the security area of WSNs covers development of new security 
algorithms that consume low energy and memory (Perrig et al., 2002), comparison of energy 
efficient security algorithm including Public Key Cryptography (PKC) and symmetry 
cryptography technique (Pathan & Choong Seon, 2008) and finally hardware 
implementation of security algorithms (Ekanayake et al., 2004, Gaubatz et al., 2005, Huai et 
al., 2009, Huang & Penzhorn, 2005, Kocabas et al., 2008a, Lee et al., 2008, Suh et al., 2005). Our 
work is basically inspired by (Grobschadl et al., 2008) suggesting hybrid implementations in 
securing WSNs applications.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents security challenges in WSN 
area. Section 3 briefly define physical attacks in WSNs. Section 4 will discusses the trusted 
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platform techniques followed by section 5 which focusses on the related studies on 
hardware based security for WSN and subsequently section 6 presents the proposed 
security work. Finally section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Security Challenges in WSN 
Security challenges in WSNs can be divided into three different categories that are related to 
each other. 1 Network–Ensuring reliable, secure and trusted communication. 2 Data–Ensuring 
the integrity of the transmitted and processed data and finally 3Platform-Guarantee the 
integrity of the sensor node exist in the network. Future applications such as medical health, 
military, system monitoring, smart home and many more, demand higher security levels 
that include access control, explicit omission or freshness, confidentiality, authenticity and 
integrity (Verma, 2006). Detailed analysis of security demand in various types of 
applications with potential security threats can be found in (Amin et al., 2008a).  Fig. 1, 
briefly shows common security goals of WSN based on the works of F.Amin and N.Verma . 
In order to achieve the above goals, PKC is believed to be capable of supporting asymmetric 
key management as well as authenticity and integrity. Although the use of PKC in WSN is 
previously denied due to its high resourced (energy, memory and computational) (Yong et 
al., 2006), many recent works have proved its feasibility in the WSN area (Kocabas et al., 
2008b). Latest, Wen Hu (Hu et al., 2009) used Trusted Platform Module hardware which is 
based on Public Key (PK) platform to augment the security of the sensor node. They claim 
that the SecFleck architecture provides internet level PK services with reasonable energy 
consumption and financial overhead.  
 
Future applications such as medical health, military, system monitoring, smart home and 
many more, demand higher security levels that include access control, freshness, 
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity (Verma, 2006). Detailed analysis of security 
demand in various types of applications with potential security threats can be found in 
(Amin et al., 2008a).  Listed goals in Fig. 1, are achievable through PKC implementation 
supporting asymmetric key management as well as authenticity and integrity. Although the 
use of PKC in WSN is previously denied due to its high resourced (energy, memory and 
computational) (Yong et al., 2006), many recent works have proved its feasibility in the WSN 
area (Kocabas et al., 2008b). Latest, Wen Hu (Hu et al., 2009) used Trusted Platform Module 
hardware which is based on Public Key (PK) platform to augment the security of the sensor 
node. They claim that the SecFleck architecture provides internet level PK services with 
reasonable energy consumption and financial overhead.  
 
It can be concluded that the demand for higher security levels in WSN increase significantly 
with the advancements in WSN applications. As mentioned earlier, the feasibility of PKC in 
WSN security is proven and therefore the choice of PKC as the best cryptography protocol 
in WSN area has been established. The concern now is what is the best method to 
implement PKC in the sensor node and is it secure to run security protocol in on unsecured 
platform considering the nature of the WSN node that is normally expose to software attack 
and physical attack? Security provided by cryptography depends on safeguarding of 
cryptographic keys from adversaries. Therefore there is a need to adequately protect the 
keys to ensure confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data.  While majority of the work 
 
 
done in WSN security have focused on the security of the network (Hu et al., 2009), our 
proposed works will consider the three challenges describe earlier to secure the WSNs 
applications from software and physical types of attacks. Beside we will also ensure smallest 
security parameter in our overall security design.  
 
At this stage, the authors believe that embedding the security parameters in the processor is 
the most suitable technique for securing wireless sensor node. This technique is believed to 
be capable of reducing the size of the sensor node, decreasing the processing time and 
preventing software and physical attacks as well as providing other benefits. Johann et al. in 
his paper (Grobschadl et al., 2008) also conclude that hardware based security features need 
to be integrated into the processor to avoid vulnerabilities such as those which exist in 
today’s personal computer. Besides secure implementation, the node also should 
communicate in a trusted environment. Tiago and Don (Alves et al., 2004) mentioned that 
the demand in trusted computing is driven by the potentially severe economic consequences 
due to unsecured embedded applications.  Following section will only consider security 
design for the third type of security challenges with the intention to secure the sensor node 
from physical attacks and ensure the integrity of the sensor node in the network.  
 
3. Physical Attacks in WSN 
Effect on attacks to WSNs applications can either be direct or indirect. While the first can 
cause disclosure of private information, modification and falsification of data and sensor 
node failure, the latter will basically cause unreliable services to the WSNs applications such 
as low data rate, service breakdown and inconsistent communication. Both effects are 
mostly the result of physical attacks or node tampering.   
 
Tampering 
Tampering as defined by A.Becher et.al (Becher et al., 2006) is the ability to get full access to 
the node and it involves a modification to  the internal structure of the chip.  Physical 
attacks on the other hand are  referring to attacks that require direct physical access to the 
sensor node. W.Znaidi et al. On the other hand, defined tampering as an action that 
involved physical access and node capture (Znaidi et al., 2008). To avoid terminology 
problem, ‘tampering’ in this paper is as defined by A.Becher et al. and is seen as impossible 
in WSNs application as it involved sophisticated tools and takes a  longer time to complete 
(Base station may have terminated communication with this sensor node by this time). 
Therefore it is not as  likely to happen  as the attacks that can be carried out in the field.  
 
Physical Attacks   
As defined earlier, physical attacks refer to attacks that involves direct connection with the 
sensor node. Adversaries may perform the attack by connecting their sophisticated tools on 
the site or taking away the sensor node. Their intention might vary from just to destroy the 
sensor node to extracting private information to be authenticated or  authorized in the 
network. Sensor nodes  can usually be attacked through the JTAG port that is widely used 
during the development phase and for debugging. With the JTAG port being enabled, 
adversaries will have the capability to take control of the whole system. Another form of attack 
is by exploiting the Bootstrap Loader (BSL) and this mostly happens during the boot up 
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Tampering as defined by A.Becher et.al (Becher et al., 2006) is the ability to get full access to 
the node and it involves a modification to  the internal structure of the chip.  Physical 
attacks on the other hand are  referring to attacks that require direct physical access to the 
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involved physical access and node capture (Znaidi et al., 2008). To avoid terminology 
problem, ‘tampering’ in this paper is as defined by A.Becher et al. and is seen as impossible 
in WSNs application as it involved sophisticated tools and takes a  longer time to complete 
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Therefore it is not as  likely to happen  as the attacks that can be carried out in the field.  
 
Physical Attacks   
As defined earlier, physical attacks refer to attacks that involves direct connection with the 
sensor node. Adversaries may perform the attack by connecting their sophisticated tools on 
the site or taking away the sensor node. Their intention might vary from just to destroy the 
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during the development phase and for debugging. With the JTAG port being enabled, 
adversaries will have the capability to take control of the whole system. Another form of attack 
is by exploiting the Bootstrap Loader (BSL) and this mostly happens during the boot up 
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process. With having access to the boot devices and debug session, attackers will be able to 
study the systems and its operation thus providing them with enough information to clone the 
system, insert malware and disturb the overall operations of the sensor node and its systems. 
 
Although a total solution to physical attacks are almost impossible, designers should 
concentrate on methods to secure and protect the sensitive information from physical 
attacks. The paragraph below discusses possible solutions towards confirming the integrity 
of codes running in the sensor node and protecting highly sensitive data through Trusted 
Computing and TrustZone technology. 
 
  Fig. 1. Common Security Goals in Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
4. Trusted Platform Technique 
It is believed that nothing is secured and can be trusted. With enough time and money, 
attackers will definitely find a way to break and attack any systems. Therefore a clear 
definition of a trusted system is needed. According to (Grawrock, 2009), trust can be defined 
as an entity that always behaves in the expected way for the intended function. Basic 
properties of a trusted computer or systems [referenced from?]can be listed as below. 
 Isolation of programs – prevent program A from accessing data of program B 
 Clear separation between user and supervisor process – there should be a systems 
to prevent user applications from interfering with the operating system. 
 Long term protected storage – secret values are stored in a place that last across 
power cycles and other events. 
 Identification of current configuration – provide identity of the platform and 
software or hardware executing on it. 
 Verifiable report of the platform identity and current configuration – a way for 
other users to validate a platform. 
 Hardware basis for the protections - protection is a combination of hardware and 
software. 
 
Demand on a trusted platform in the network environment arrived when merely software 
based mechanisms became inadequate to provide the desired security level. Trusted 
Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) was formed in late 90’s and finally emerged as the  
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) in 2003 (Groups, 2008). TCG has basically worked to 
develop an inexpensive chip that helps users protect their sensitive information. 
 
 
Muhammad Amin (Amin et al., 2008b) in his paper discussed on the trends and directions in 
trusted computing. His paper provides details on advancement of trusted hardware to 
facilitate security that led to the design and implementation of TCG specific solution. This 
paper also claims that ARM is the only trusted implementation available for secure 
embedded applications.     
 
The following section discusses two alternatives that can be used to establish trusted and 
secure security systems followed by review on hardware-based security implementation.  
 
4.1 Trusted Platform Module 
Trusted Computing Groups (TCG) solves security problems through operating 
environments, applications and secure hardware changes to the personal computer. TCG 
used secure hardware Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip as a basis for trusted computing 
that provides a level of relevant since hardware based security is difficult to compromise 
than conventional approaches. 
 
TPM   verifies the integrity of the system through trusted boot, strong process isolation and 
remote attestation that verify the authenticity of the platform.  Encryption and decryption 
used RSA algorithm with default 2048-bit, SHA-1 hash and random key generator. TPM can 
be implemented in a dedicated chip, co-processor or in software  (Grobschadl et al., 2008) 
where the configuration of TPM is vendor specific and is not specified by TCG. Fig. 2 briefly 
shows block diagram of TPM consisting of ten components to accelerate security processes.  
 
  
Fig. 2. Standard TPM Components 
 
Unfortunately, the choice of RSA and SHA-1 algorithms has made the platform unsuitable 
for WSN applications. RSA with 2048 bits has been confirm to consume higher energy and 
therefore unsuitable for WSN applications and embedded system (Amin et al., 2008a).  
Moreover, RSA when implemented in hardware demand large silicon area and therefore 
increase the size of the chip (Kocabas et al., 2008b). An alternative to RSA is Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) and Advance Encryption System (AES). Beside RSA, the choice of 
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SHA-1 is also mooted. Recent research indicates that many cryptographers doubt the 
security of SHA-1 and recommend against the use in new design.  
 
To conclude, TPM model may not be the best choice for secure or trusted platform 
implementation in embedded systems especially in WSN applications due to the 
performance and security concern. Most importantly, the TPM is designed for the personal 
computer which does not usually have concerns on resource constraints. 
 
4.2 Trust Zone in ARM Microprocessor  
The key feature of the ARM trust zone is “secure to the core”. The security features are hard 
wired into the microprocessor core and therefore promise an extra degree of security over a 
software only approach and external security chip approach (Halfhill, 2003).  
 
The ARM trust zone is specifically designed for smart phones, handheld devices and 
embedded systems that can potentially be compromised by malicious hackers. The nature of 
WSN that exposes it to too many types of attacks and intrusions demand extra security 
features that not only support security but also trustworthiness.  
 
Wilson et. al (Wilson et al., 2007) in his paper viewed trustzone in ARM as a dual-virtual 
CPU Systems. The running software looks at the trustzone as two separate virtual 
processors. The virtualization is achieved through hardware extension within the CPU 
design. The extensions annotate whether the core is running Normal World or Secure World 
software and propagate these selections to the memory and peripherals. With this 
implementation, the secure memory and peripherals can reject the non-secure transactions.   
 
 
 
Fig. 3. One core support two operating worlds: secure world and normal world. Courtesy of: 
Wilson.P et.al (Wilson et al., 2007) 
 
 
The switching between secure and non-secure world in the ARM processor is established 
through the Secure Monitor Call (SMC) instruction and interrupts. In line with WSN 
constraints, the trust zone in the ARM processor eliminates the need for extra security chip. 
Moreover, security elements can be executed at full processor speed without cache-flushing 
overhead. It can also save the power as only one of the two virtual processors run at one 
time. Fig. 3 shows how trustzone mimics two processors. 
 
5. Related Studies 
G.Edward Suh et.al (Suh et al., 2007) in his work presented an AEGIS secure processor 
architecture that secure the embedded system beyond normal security algorithm. AEGIS, a 
single-chip secure processor, introduces mechanisms that not only authenticate the platform 
and software but also protect the integrity and privacy of applications from physical attacks. 
Two new techniques are introduced to overcome physical and software attacks in WSN, 
Physical Random Functions (PUFs) and off-chip memory functions. 
Physical Random Function (PUFs) is a function that generates secret numbers so that users 
can authenticate the processor that they are interacting with. With PUFs the secret are 
generated dynamically by the processor and therefore provide higher physical security 
compared to storing the secrets in non-volatile memory. Besides, PUFs also do not need any 
special manufacturing process or special programming and testing steps. 
Off-chip memory mechanisms ensure the integrity and the privacy of off-chip memory by 
encrypting and decrypting all off-chip memory data transfer using a one-time pad 
encryption scheme. To summarize, AEGIS can protect embedded devices from any attacks 
before program execution, during the execution and also from physical and software attacks 
through the security mechanism designed. Unfortunately, the added hardware mechanisms 
had increased the size of the processor core and marginally degrade program performance.  
Lie et. al. (Lie et al., 2000) from Stanford University introduced Execute Only Memory 
(XOM) that enabled copy and tamper resistant software distribution to prevent software 
piracy. All data leaving the machine is encrypted using symmetric-key encryption and the 
keys are specifically distributed to each processor using public-private key pair. This 
technique provides a software tamper-resistant execution environment that is established 
through tagging or encryption. Unfortunately, hardware assist is considered necessary in 
XOM architecture to provide fast symmetric ciphers.  
SecFleck (Hu et al., 2009) which was mentioned earlier used external TPM chip on the sensor 
node. This TPM based public key platform facilitates message security services with 
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity. SecFleck platform consists of hardware and 
software module and later connects to the Fleck sensor node board. Although the evaluation 
on the computation time, energy consumption, memory footprint and cost is reasonable and 
positive, the extra platform connected to the sensor node is unacceptable for sensor node 
applications. Besides the security algorithm used is not aligned with sensor node constraints. 
Another work on hardware based security is done by (PANIANDI, 2006, Pin, 2009) where 
both works developed a co-processor for security algorithm. While the first work developed 
RSA co-processor, the second work implements an AES co-processor (VHDL design only) 
for resource constraint embedded system.  RSA co-processor was implemented on Altera 
Stratix FPGA development board. Both works claim to have better speed and area compared 
to other research and commercial implementation. 
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technique provides a software tamper-resistant execution environment that is established 
through tagging or encryption. Unfortunately, hardware assist is considered necessary in 
XOM architecture to provide fast symmetric ciphers.  
SecFleck (Hu et al., 2009) which was mentioned earlier used external TPM chip on the sensor 
node. This TPM based public key platform facilitates message security services with 
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity. SecFleck platform consists of hardware and 
software module and later connects to the Fleck sensor node board. Although the evaluation 
on the computation time, energy consumption, memory footprint and cost is reasonable and 
positive, the extra platform connected to the sensor node is unacceptable for sensor node 
applications. Besides the security algorithm used is not aligned with sensor node constraints. 
Another work on hardware based security is done by (PANIANDI, 2006, Pin, 2009) where 
both works developed a co-processor for security algorithm. While the first work developed 
RSA co-processor, the second work implements an AES co-processor (VHDL design only) 
for resource constraint embedded system.  RSA co-processor was implemented on Altera 
Stratix FPGA development board. Both works claim to have better speed and area compared 
to other research and commercial implementation. 
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Latest, two studies have embarked on the development of trusted and secure platform 
utilizing ARM11 trustzone architecture. Johannes Winter(Winter, 2008) and Xu Yang-
ling(Xu et al., 2008), both utilize Linux kernel 2.6 and ARM trustzone features. While 
Johannes merge trustzone features with TCG-style trusted computing concepts, Mobile 
Trusted Module (MTM), Xu integrate the Mandatory Access Control (MAC) in Linux kernel 
2.6 with the trustzone features to enhance the security up to the non-secure environment. 
The first has designed a robust and portable virtualization framework for handling non-
secure guest and the second work presented an embedded system security solution.   
 
6. Proposed Work 
This work proposes the development of a sensor node platform utilizing ARM11, a 32-bit 
processor. This work was prompted due to lack of highly secured sensor node platform to 
accommodate future wireless sensor networks applications. Almost all available sensor 
node platforms (Healy et al., 2008) utilize software based security. This work proposed the 
use of trustzone feature in the ARM11 processor to enhance the security level by limiting the 
security parameter to a single chip. All important keys and data will be saved in the On-SoC 
memory thus provide better shielding to private information on the platform.  
 
6.1 Security Architecture 
The primary goals are to assert the integrity of the software images executed in the sensor 
node platform by preventing any unauthorized or malicious modified software from 
running and to  ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the data during communications. 
 
The above objectives are established through proper security architecture designed utilizing 
ARM trust zone features.  
 Secure world – all the sensitive resources will be placed in the secure world memory 
locations. Trust zone Address space controller (TZASC) is used to configure regions 
as secure or non-secure.  All non-secure process will be rejected to the region that is 
configured as secure. This ensures the confidentiality of important data.   
 Single physical core – safe and efficient execution of code from both normal and 
secure world. This allows high performance security software to run alongside 
with normal world operating environment. Secure monitor code will be developed 
to switch from normal to secure and vice versa. 
 Secure boot – Running secure boot algorithm to ensure the integrity of the software 
images and devices on the platform.  
 On-Soc RAM and ROM will ensure no highly sensitive data leaves the chip thus 
eliminating the possibility of physical attacks. 
 * Identity based Encryption Algorithm for confidentiality and integrity of the data 
during communications. (Communications between sensor node and base station) 
 
By using ARM trust zone, a small on-chip security system is presented in Fig. 4 below to 
execute the above objectives. It clearly depicts the permanent secure place and dynamic 
secure place that are accessible through AXI2APB bus system which has the capability to 
switch from secure process and non-secure process. Trust Zone Memory Adapter (TZMA) 
 
 
will secure a region within an on-SoC memory such as SRAM where the secure location will 
be in the lower part of the memory region. 
 
*Not discussed in this paper. 
 Fig. 4. Proposed security architecture for sensor node using ARM11 with Trust zone features. 
 
Trust zone Address Space Controller (TZASC) will reject any non-secure transaction to a 
region that is configured as secure. Therefore external memory also can be partitioned into 
secure and non-secure region.  Compared to previous works, the proposed security 
architecture has extended the security infrastructure throughout the system design. Instead 
of protecting assets in a dedicated hardware block, this architecture has made the valuable 
assets secured in the most protected location.  
 
On top of the hardware design, a suitable security protocol such as secure boot will also be 
configured to complete the security design. Secure boot with the root of trust located in On-
SoC ROM will provide a  chain of trust for all the secure world software and hardware 
peripherals and some of the normal world software. With secure boot, the integrity of the 
OS image, software and peripherals on the platform can be verified to be truly 
unadulterated. Communications right after the secure boot process can be confirmed 
coming from a trusted sensor node.  
 
Table 1 clearly depicts the advantage of the proposed security mechanism over previous 
work. Although the security level of the second technique is comparable with the proposed 
work, this proposed scheme offers extra advantages in term of power consumption and 
overall performance. While in AEGIS for example two processors are needed to run secure 
and normal process, in trustzone the dual virtual CPU will execute one of the processes 
(secure or non-secure) at one time thus eliminate extra processing work and reducing the 
chip size. Moreover, AEGIS works is does not consider WSNs constraints. Finally, since 
extra chip on the embedded applications board are not desirable, the first technique or work 
can be considered as irrelevant for WSN security implementation. 
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Previous Worked  Definition Advantage Drawback Secure(S) 
Trusted (T) 
Attacks 
Physical 
(PHY) 
Software 
(SW) 
Consider 
WSN 
constraints?  
External 
Hardware 
TPM – RSA [3] 
TPM -  IBE [18] 
AES -  [5] 
RSA – [4][19] 
I 
Inclusion of a 
dedicated 
hardware 
security 
module outside 
of the main 
processor 
 
Separate chip.  
Allows high 
levels of tamper 
resistance and 
physical 
security. 
 
Sensitive 
resources 
leave the 
chip.  
Increase area 
and power 
consumption  
Physical 
attacks 
 
T&S 
T&S 
S 
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 SW 
 
 
NO 
Embedded 
Hardware 
AEGIS - AES[1] 
XOM- [2] 
Hardware 
security 
modules that is 
located within 
the SoC.  
Significant cost 
reduction 
performance 
improvement 
over external 
hardware. 
Security is 
comparable to 
trust zone 
technique.  
Restricted 
perimeter 
and only 
capable of 
securing on-
chip 
components.  
Not flexible 
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SW & PHY 
 
NO 
 
 
Embedded 
security H/W 
with Dual Virtual 
CPU (Trustzone 
(TZ)) 
 
TZ+MTM [6] 
 
TZ+MAC [7] 
 
 
Hardware 
architecture 
that extends the 
security 
infrastructure 
throughout the 
system design.  
 
Trustzone 
architecture 
enables any 
part of the 
system to be 
made secure. 
Significant cost 
reduction 
Performance 
improvement 
over external 
h/ware.  
Only one 
process exist at 
one time 
(secure or non-
secure)- reduce 
power 
Secure all 
sensitive 
resources. 
Flexible design- 
can secure up 
to off-chip 
components 
 
 
 
For mobile 
appliances  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T&S 
 
 
T&S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SW & PHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
Proposed work 
ARM11 with 
Trustzone 
As above As Above 
 
For sensor 
node 
T&S SW & PHY YES 
 
Table 1. Comparison Study on Trusted Implementation for Wireless Sensor Network 
 
7. Conclusion 
The security features discussed earlier are intended for highly secure applications dealing with 
crucial financial information, noncritical military communications, medical data, and critical 
 
 
corporate information. Detail on security level can be found in (Groups, 2010). Two dominant 
features that differentiate this work from others are the placement of sensitive resources such 
as the crypto keys within the embedded system and the denial of extra or dedicated processor 
core for security purposes. This implementation ensures no sensitive resources leaves the chip 
and therefore blocks most types of attacks. Besides that it also saves the silicon area and power 
consumption and also allows high performance security software to run alongside with the 
normal world operating environment. It is hoped that the outcome from this work can 
contribute towards higher security level in the area of WSN. Finally the choice of ARM11 as 
the main processor for the sensor node is in line with the constraint faced in sensor node 
development as it is rated as the most efficient processor in MIPS/Watt (Vieira et al., 2003). 
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